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Abstract We consider a class of multi-player games with perfect information and
deterministic transitions, where each player controls exactly one non-absorbing state,
and where rewards are zero for the non-absorbing states. With respect to the average
reward, we provide a combinatorial proof that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium exists,
for every game in our class and for every ε > 0. We believe that the proof of this result
is an important step towards a proof for the more general hypothesis that all perfect
information stochastic games, with finite state space and finite action spaces, have a
subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0 with respect to the average reward
criterium.
Keywords Perfect information game · Recursive game · Subgame-perfect
equilibrium · Average reward
1 Introduction
We consider a subclass of stochastic games with finite state and action spaces. Shapley
(1953) introduced the class of zero-sum stochastic games. He proved that such games
have a value, under the assumption that there is a positive stopping probability after
each move by the players, or similarly, under the assumption that stage rewards are
discounted. Mertens and Neyman (1981) demonstrated that every such game also has
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a value with respect to the average reward. Vieille (2000a, b) showed that all non-
zerosum two-player stochastic games have an ε-equilibrium for the average reward,
for every ε > 0.
It follows from the result of Mertens (1987) that multi-player stochastic games
with deterministic transitions and with perfect information admit an ε-equilibrium for
the average reward, for every ε > 0. Thuijsman and Raghavan (1997) showed that
they even admit a 0-equilibrium. These ε-equilibria are however not always subgame-
perfect. An example by Solan and Vieille (2003) demonstrated that a subgame perfect
0-equilibrium need not exist.
The question remains open whether subgame perfect ε-equilibria exist, for every
ε > 0. In this paper, we consider a subclass of stochastic games, where each player
controls exactly one non-absorbing state, and where non-zero rewards can only be
obtained by entering an absorbing state. The technical novelty of this class is that it
combines two features that both make it hard to analyse the game: (1) payoffs can
be negative in the absorbing states, (2) it may be impossible to move from one non-
absorbing state to another non-absorbing state immediately. The technique to deal with
these difficulties builds further on those in Flesch et al. (2010a, b), and Kuipers et al.
(2013), and may be flexible enough to deal with the entire class of perfect information
stochastic games.
For more results on related models, we refer to e.g. Flesch et al. (2014), Flesch
and Predtetchinski (2015a, b), Kuipers et al. (2009), Laraki et al. (2013), Purves and
Sudderth (2011), and Ummels (2005).
2 The class G and playing a subgame perfect ε-equilibrium
2.1 The model
We consider the class G of games, given by
(1) a nonempty set of players N = {1, . . . , n};
(2) exactly two states associated with each player t ∈ N : one non-absorbing state
identified with t , and one absorbing state denoted by t∗; the set of absorbing states
is denoted by N∗, and the set of all states is denoted by S = N ∪ N∗;
(3) for each state t ∈ N , a set of states A(t) ⊆ N ∪ {t∗} with t∗ ∈ A(t) and t /∈ A(t);
for each state t∗ ∈ N∗, the set A(t∗) is defined as A(t∗) = {t∗};
(4) for each player t ∈ N , an associated (reward) vector r(t) ∈ RN .
A game in G is to be played at stages in N in the following way. At any stage m
one state is called active. If t ∈ N is active, then player t announces a state in A(t),
and the announced state will be active at the next stage. The rewards to the players
are zero when this happens. If t∗ ∈ N∗ is active, then the unique state t∗ ∈ A(t∗) will
be active at the next stage (thus, t∗ will be active forever). The stage rewards to the
players when this happens are according to r(t), and since r(t) will be the reward at
every subsequent stage, r(t) is also the (expected) average reward. The game starts
with an initial state s ∈ S.
We assume complete information (i.e. the players know all the data of the game),
full monitoring (i.e. the players observe the active state and the action chosen by the
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active player), and perfect recall (i.e. the players remember the entire sequence of
active states and actions).
Playing a game in G can be interpreted as making an infinite walk in the directed
graphG = (S, E), where E = {(x, y) | x ∈ S and y ∈ A(x)}. In this paper, whenever
we refer to an ordered pair (x, y) as an edge, it is implicit that x ∈ S and y ∈ A(x),
i.e. we mean that (x, y) is an element of E .
Let H be a subgraph of G, and denote the edge-set of H by E(H).
Plans. A plan in H is an infinite sequence of states g = (tm)m∈N (where N =
{1, 2, . . .}), such that (tm, tm+1) ∈ E(H) for all tm ∈ N. A plan in G is simply called a
plan. A plan is interpreted as a prescription for play for a game with initial active state
t1. The set of states that become active during play if plan g is executed is denoted by
S(g) ⊆ S, i.e. S(g) = {t ∈ S | ∃m ∈ N : tm = t}, and the set of players that become
active during play is denoted by N(g) ⊆ N , i.e. N(g) = {t ∈ N | ∃m ∈ N : tm = t}.
Notice that, if the initial state of g is an element of N∗, then g is of the form (t∗, t∗, . . .),
with t∗ ∈ N∗. Also, if plan g contains a state in N∗, say t∗, and the initial state of g
is an element of N , then we must have t ∈ N (g) and there must be a stage M with
tM = t and with tm = t∗ for all m > M . This is interpreted as a prescription for t to
announce his absorbing state t∗ at stage M . We say that the plan absorbs at t if this
is the case. If S(g) ⊆ N , then we say that the plan is non-absorbing. We denote by
φt (g) the average reward to player t when play is according to g, i.e. φt (g) = rt (x)
if g absorbs at x , and φt (g) = 0 if g is non-absorbing. The initial state of plan g is
denoted by first(g).
Paths. A path (or history) in H is a finite sequence p = (tm)km=1 with k ≥ 1, such
that (tm, tm+1) ∈ E(H) for all m ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. A path in G is simply a path. The
number k − 1 is called the length of the path. The initial state t1 of path p is denoted
by first(p) and the final state tk is denoted by last(p). If the length of the path is
at least 1, i.e. if the path contains at least one edge, we allow ourselves to say that p
is a path from t1 to tk . We will sometimes want to concatenate a number of paths to
make a longer path or a plan, or we may want to concatenate a finite number of paths
and a plan to make another plan. We allow concatenation if p1, p2, . . . pm are paths
that satisfy last(pk) = first(pk+1) for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}. The concatenation
of these paths is denoted by 〈p1, p2, . . . pm〉 and it represents the path that follows
the prescription of p1 from first(p1) to last(p1) = first(p2), then follows the
prescription of p2 until last(p2) = first(p3) is reached, and so on, until last(pm)
is reached. Also, if g is a plan with first(g) = last(pm), then the plan that first
follows the prescription of 〈p1, p2, . . . , pm〉, and then switches to g is denoted by
〈p1, . . . , pm, g〉. Finally, if we have an infinite number of paths p1, p2, . . . with the
property last(pk) = first(pk+1) for all k ∈ N, then 〈p1, p2, . . .〉 represents the path
or plan that subsequently follows the prescription of p1, p2, etc. (The concatenation
of an infinite number of paths is still a path if only finitely many of them have positive
length). Let P denote the set of all possible paths, and for t ∈ N , let Pt denote the set
of all paths with endpoint t .
Strategies. A strategy π t for player t is a decision rule that, for any path p ∈ Pt ,
prescribes a probability distribution π t (p) over the elements of A(t). We use the
notation t for the set of strategies for player t . A strategy π t ∈ t is called pure if
every prescription π t (p) places probability 1 on one of the elements of A(t). We use
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the notation  for the set of joint strategies π = (π t )t∈N with π t ∈ t for t ∈ N . A
joint strategy π = (π t )t∈N is pure if π t is pure for all t ∈ N , in which case we say
that play is deterministic.
In this paper, we will sometimes define joint strategies by formulating a prescrip-
tion of play for several stages of the game, possibly for the entire game, which holds
only so long as players execute actions that are assigned a positive probability by the
prescription. In the event that a player chooses an action that is assigned probabil-
ity 0, a revised prescription is formulated. Specifically, we will consider two types of
prescribed play, called default mode and threat mode.
Default mode is characterized by a plan g. During default mode, one of the players
on g is active and he is required to follow the prescription of g. Play will stay in default
mode characterized by g during the entire game, provided that players indeed follow
the plan.
Threat mode is characterized by a triple (g, v, x), where g and v are plans and
where x is a player located on g, such that first(v) ∈ A(x) and such that the state
on g following the first occurrence of x differs from first(v). During threat mode,
the active player is either located on g before the first occurrence of x or it is the first
occurrence of x . If the active player is located before x , then he is required to follow
the prescription of g. If the active player is the first occurrence of x on g, then he is
required to perform a lottery, in which to place probability ε on the switch to v, and
probability 1− ε on the continuation of g (The requirement that first(v) differs from
the state following x on g ensures that the lottery places positive probability on two
different options). Threat mode ends after the lottery and play returns to default mode
characterized by either g or v, depending on the outcome of the lottery.
The triple (g, v, x) that characterizes threat mode is always chosen such that there
exists y ∈ N located on g after the first occurrence of x on g, and such that φy(v) <
φy(g). The interpretation here is that y is the threatened player and that the threat
consists of the possible switch from plan g to plan v.
Here, we will not say how a revised prescription is formulated, once a player plays
an action that has probability 0 according π . This is postponed until the proof of our
main Theorem 2.1.
Expected rewards. Consider a joint strategy π ∈  and a path p ∈ P . Suppose that
the game has developed along the path p and that state last(p) is now active. Suppose
further that all players, starting at last(p), follow the joint strategy π , taking p as
the history of the game. Denote the overall probability of absorption at t by Pp,π (t).
In our model, where non-zero rewards only occur in absorbing states, we see that the
expected average reward for player t exists, and that it can be expressed as
ψ
p
t (π) :=
∑
u∈N
Pp,π (u)rt (u).
If π is a pure joint strategy, then following π results in deterministic play, which can
be described by a plan. If we denote this induced plan by gp,π , then the expected
average reward is given by
ψ
p
t (π) = φt (gp,π ).
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If a joint strategy is given in terms of prescribed play, then it is sufficient to know the
mode of play (default or threat) at last(p) and the data to describe that mode. If play
is in default mode according to plan g, then the expected reward for an arbitrary player
t ∈ N is given by
ψ
p
t (π) = φt (g).
If play is in threatmode according to (g, v, x), then the expected reward for an arbitrary
player t ∈ N is given by
ψ
p
t (π) = (1 − ε)φt (g) + εφt (v).
Equilibria. Still consider the joint strategy π ∈  and a game that has developed
along the path p ∈ P . The joint strategy π = (π t )t∈N ∈  is called a (Nash)
ε-equilibrium for path p, for some ε ≥ 0, if
ψ
p
t
(
σ t , (πu)u∈N−{t}
) ≤ ψ pt (π) + ε ∀σ t ∈ t , ∀t ∈ N ,
which means that, given history p, no player t can gain more than ε by a unilateral
deviation from his proposed strategy π t to an alternative strategy σ t . The joint strategy
π is called an ε-equilibrium for initial state s ∈ N if π is an ε-equilibrium for path (s).
The joint strategy π is called a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium if π is an ε-equilibrium
for every path p ∈ P .
2.2 Strategic concepts
We now describe some strategic concepts, necessary to compute and describe a sub-
game perfect ε-equilibrium for a game in the class G.
For α ∈ RN , a plan g, and a player x ∈ N , we say that x is α-satisfied by g if
φx (g) ≥ αx . We define
sat(g, α) = {x ∈ N | x isα-satisfied by g}.
We say that plan g is α-viable if N(g) ⊆ sat(g, α). This means that, if play is
according to g, every player t that becomes active during play will receive an average
reward of at least αt . Notice that a plan of the form g = (t∗, t∗, . . .) with t∗ ∈ N∗
is trivially α-viable, since N(g) = ∅. For every state t ∈ S, we denote the set of
α-viable plans g with first(g) = t by viable(t, α). Notice that, for t∗ ∈ N∗, the set
viable(t∗, α) consists of only the plan (t∗, t∗, . . .).
Not all α-viable plans are equally credible as prescriptions for play. Let t ∈ N , let
u ∈ A(t), and let g ∈ viable(u, α). Imagine that plan g is proposed as a prescription
for play and suppose that t is located on g. Then player t may prefer to announce
u when he becomes active, instead of following the prescription of g. Indeed, if the
other players keep restarting plan g each time that t announces u, and if player t keeps
announcing u when he becomes active, then play will not absorb and player t may
profit from this. The following definition of admissible plans is meant to select the
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Fig. 1 Representation of two
example games
α-viable plans, where such a deviation by player t is not possible, not profitable for t ,
or can be countered with a credible threat by one of the other players.
For t ∈ N , and a plan g ∈ viable(u, α) with u ∈ A(t), say that g is (t, u, α)-
admissible if at least one of the following holds:
AD-i: t /∈ N(g) or g is non-absorbing;
AD-ii: αt > 0;
AD-iii: t ∈ N(g) and there exists a pair (x, v), such that x = t is a player who
resides on g in the part from u to the first occurrence of t , such that v is an α-viable
plan with first(v) ∈ A(x), such that first(v) is not the state following the first
occurrence of x on plan g, and such that x, t /∈ sat(v, α).
We denote the set of plans that are (t, u, α)-admissible by admiss(t, u, α).
Condition AD-i describes the situation, where the announcement of u by player t is
not possible (the case t /∈ N(g)) or would yield the same average reward as g (the case
that g is non-absorbing). Condition AD-ii describes the situation, where this deviation,
if it is possible, would yield a strictly lower average reward for t , as the non-absorbing
plan yields zero average reward, while g yields an average reward of at least αt > 0.
Condition AD-iii describes the situation, where a player x with x = t and participating
in the non-absorbing plan created by t’s deviation to u, has the threat of switching
to an α-viable plan v with t, x /∈ sat(v, α). Now, if prescribed play is not exactly
g, but if player x is required to place a very small probability on a switch to v, the
first time he is active, then play will still be according to g with very high probability
if players follow the prescription. Player t will not be able to profit from continuous
deviation to u, as this would eventually result in a switch to v with probability 1 and
t /∈ sat(v, α). Player x will not be tempted to increase the probability of a switch to
v, since x /∈ sat(v, α).
Example 2.1 Figure 1 represents two games,1 each with two players, 1 and 2. Only the
two nodes that correspond to the non-absorbing states of these players are depicted, and
the vectors below these states are the rewards that will be obtained if the controlling
player chooses his absorbing state. For both games, the arc from 2 to 1 indicates
that 1 ∈ A(2), hence A(2) = {1, 2∗}, and the other arc indicates 2 ∈ A(1), hence
A(1) = {2, 1∗}.
For game I, let us take αt = rt (t) for t = 1, 2, i.e. α1 = 1 and α2 = −1. Then,
every plan that absorbs at 2 is α-viable. The plan (1, 1∗, 1∗, . . .) is also α-viable,
but any plan in which player 2 is active and that absorbs at 1 is not α-viable, since
such a plan does not α-satisfy player 2. The two non-absorbing plans (1, 2, 1, 2, . . .)
and (2, 1, 2, 1, . . .) are not α-viable, since player 1 is active in both plans and is not
α-satisfied by them.
1 Game I is a game from Solan and Vieille (2003).
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All plans in viable(2, α) are (1, 2, α)-admissible, since α1 = 1 > 0, i.e. condition
AD-ii is satisfied. All plans in viable(1, α) are (2, 1, α)-admissible. For the plan
(1, 1∗, 1∗, . . .) this is true, since 2 is not active in the plan, hence the plan satisfies
AD-i. For the plans in viable(1, α) that absorb at 2 this is true, since these plans
satisfy AD-iii, which is seen by letting (x, v) = (1, (1∗, 1∗, . . .)).
For game II, let us also take αt = rt (t) for t = 1, 2, i.e. α1 = α2 = −2. Here, it
is clear that every plan is α-viable. Any plan that starts at 1 and absorbs at 2 is not
(2, 1, α)-admissible however, since conditions AD-i, AD-ii, and AD-iii are all three
violated for such plans. The plans (1, 1∗, 1∗, . . .) and (1, 2, 1, 2, . . .) are (2, 1, α)-
admissible, as they both satisfy AD-i. By symmetry of the example, any plan that
starts at 2 and absorbs at 1 is not (1, 2, α)-admissible, but the plans (2, 2∗, 2∗, . . .) and
(2, 1, 2, 1, . . .) are. unionsq
Update procedure. We now propose a method for updating one coordinate of a
vector α ∈ RN . For t ∈ N , u ∈ A(t), and α ∈ RN , we define
β(t, u, α) = min{φt (v) | v ∈ admiss(t, u, α)}.
We define further,
δ(t, α) = max{β(t, u, α) | u ∈ A(t)},
and
B(t, α) = {u ∈ A(t) | β(t, u, α) = δ(t, α)}.
We use the convention min ∅ = ∞, so that β(t, u, α) and δ(t, α) are well defined.
Moreover, by the definition of δ(t, α), the set B(t, α) is always nonempty. The update
of vector α is done by replacing coordinate αt by δ(t, α).
Example 2.2 Let us apply the updating procedure to the two games depicted in Fig. 1,
with the initial α-values from Example 2.1.
For game I, we chose α1 = 1 and α2 = −1. Let us first update the state
controlled by player 1. We trivially have β(1, 1∗, α) = r1(1) = 1 and we have
β(1, 2, α) = φ1(2, 2∗, 2∗, . . .) = r1(2) = 2, since (2, 2∗, 2∗, . . .) is a minimizing
(1, 2, α)-admissible plan. Thus, δ(1, α) = max(1, 2) = 2, and the updated vector is
given by α∗1 = 2 and α∗2 = −1. Let us now update the updated vector α∗. This time, we
update the state controlled by player 2. We trivially have β(2, 2∗, α) = r2(2) = −1
and one can verify that β(2, 1, α) = φ1(1, 2, 2∗, 2∗, . . .) = r2(2) = −1. Thus,
δ(2, α) = max(−1,−1) = −1, and we observe that this update had no effect. One
can verify that an update of the already updated state controlled by 1 will have no
further effect either.
For game II, we chose α1 = α2 = −2. Let us denote α0 = α, and for
i > 0, let us use the notation αi for the vector that results after an update
of αi−1. We choose to update first the state controlled by player 1. We trivially
have β(1, 1∗, α) = r1(1) = −2, and the findings in Example 2.1 show that
β(1, 2, α) = min (φ1(2, 1, 2, 1, . . .), φ1(2, 2∗, 2∗, . . .)) = −1. Thus, δ(1, α) = −1
and α1 = (−1,−2). We now set α = α1 and we continue with an update of
the state controlled by player 2. We have β(2, 2∗, α) = r2(2) = −2. Notice
123
212 J. Kuipers et al.
that (1, 2, 1, 2, . . .) is the only (2, 1, α)-admissible plan. (The plan (1, 1∗, 1∗, . . .)
is not (2, 1, α)-admissible ‘anymore’, due to the previous update.) Thus, we have
β(2, 1, α) = φ2(1, 2, 1, 2, . . .) = 0. It follows that α2 = (−1, 0). We set α = α2.
Notice that only the two non-absorbing plans (1, 2, 1, 2, . . .) and (2, 1, 2, 1, . . .) are
nowα-viable. They are also respectively (2, 1, α)-admissible and (1, 2, α)-admissible.
Then β(1, 2, α) = φ1(2, 1, 2, 1, . . .) = 0, which means that we obtain α3 = (0, 0) by
updating the state controlled by 1 for the second time. After this, no update will have
any further effect. ♦
2.3 Main result
In Sects. 3 and 4, we analyze the update procedure. The analysis demonstrates that,
starting with an appropriate initial vector α0 ∈ RN , repeated application of the update
procedure will produce, in a finite number of iterations, a vector α∗ ∈ RN , such that
δ(t, α∗) = α∗t for all t ∈ N . The existence of such a ‘fixed point’ α∗ is proven in
Theorem 4.16 and it allows for the construction of a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium
for all ε > 0. The following theorem is our main result.
Theorem 2.1 There exists a subgame perfect ε-equilibrium for every game in class
G and every ε > 0.
The iterative procedure in this paper differs from those in earlier papers in the
following respects. In comparisonwith results for gameswhere all payoffs in absorbing
states are non-negative, such as in Kuipers et al. (2009) and Flesch et al. (2010a), or
where the payoffs are lower semi-continuous as in Flesch et al. (2010b), the main
role is played by the set of all viable plans, whereas in the current paper we need to
consider the more sophisticated concept of admissible plans. The need for this was
already clear from the game in Solan and Vieille (2003) (see game I in Example 2.1),
where the unique type of subgame perfect ε-equilibrium requires randomizationwhere
a player puts a small but positive probability on a suboptimal action. This is reflected
in condition AD-iii of the definition of admissible plans. The only other paper where
a similar type of iteration was applied to a game with possibly negative payoffs is
Kuipers et al. (2013), which deals with a much smaller class of games and for which
most of the concepts introduced in Sects. 3 and 4 were not needed.
Further,wewould like to relate ourmain result, Theorem2.1, to two recent existence
results. The first one is the existence result in Flesch and Predtetchinski (2015a) for
more general perfect information games.Theirmain result implies, in the context of our
model, that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium exists if the number of non-absorbing
plans is countable.2 In our model this condition is very restrictive, and is typically
violated in games which have two non-disjoint cycles of non-absorbing states. As
an example in which the condition does hold, we refer to the game by Solan and
2 Flesch and Predtetchinski (2015a) consider a fairly standard topology on the set of all plans, and they
require that the set of plans at which the payoff function of any player is discontinuous is sigma-discrete.
With respect to this topology, in our model, the payoff functions can only be discontinuous at non-absorbing
plans. Moreover, as remarked in Flesch and Predtetchinski (2015a), when the number of actions is finite,
as in our games, a set of plans is sigma-discrete if and only if this set is countable.
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Vieille in Solan and Vieille (2003) (see game I in Example 2.1), which has only one
non-absorbing plan from the initial state.
Another existence result that we mention is the one in Flesch and Predtetchinski
(2015b). Their result implies, in the context of our model, that a subgame-perfect
0-equilibrium exists in pure strategies provided that the following condition3 holds
for every cycle c of non-absorbing states: the set S∗(c) of all absorbing states that
can eventually be reached from the cycle c can be partitioned into two sets S∗−(c)
and S∗+(c) such that (1) S∗+(c) is non-empty, (2) all payoffs in the states in S∗+(c) are
positive, (3) each player prefers the payoff in any state in S∗+(c) to that in any state in
S∗−(c). Intuitively, the players would like to get absorption in a state in S∗+(c), even
though they can still disagree in which one exactly, so this condition would allow to
safely ignore absorbing states having a negative payoff.
2.4 Proof of Theorem 2.1
I: Description of a joint strategy. Take a game in G. As we remarked, a vector
α∗ ∈ RN exists such that δ(t, α∗) = α∗t for all t ∈ N . The fact that δ(t, α∗) is finite
for all t ∈ N implies that β(t, u, α∗) is finite for all t ∈ N and all u ∈ A(t). It follows
that viable(t, α∗) is non-empty for all t ∈ N and that admiss(t, u, α∗) is non-empty
for all t ∈ N and u ∈ A(t).
We can thus choose a plan gt ∈ viable(t, α∗) for all t ∈ N . We can also choose,
for all t ∈ N and all u ∈ A(t), a plan gtu ∈ admiss(t, u, α∗) such that φt (gtu) =
β(t, u, α∗). In case the choice gtu violates both AD-i and AD-ii, and therefore satisfies
AD-iii, we can make the additional choice of a player xtu ∈ N\{t} and an α∗-viable
plan vtu , such that first(vtu) ∈ A(xtu), such that first(v) is not the state following
the first occurrence of xtu on plan gtu , such that xtu resides on the non-absorbing plan
that would result if player t were to deviate from gtu by announcing u every time he
is active, and such that xtu, t /∈ sat(vtu, α∗).
Now, if s ∈ N is the initial state of the game, then we start the game in default
mode with plan gs as initial prescription. Whenever a deviation from prescribed play
is detected, say that player t deviates to u, then we check if plan gtu , associated with
the pair (t, u), satisfies AD-i or AD-ii. If so, then revised play will be in default mode
according to the (newly) prescribed plan gtu . If not, then AD-iii is satisfied, and play
will resume in threat mode according to the triple (gtu, vtu, xtu). Let us denote the
joint strategy described in this way by π .
II: Verification. Wewill verify that π is a subgame perfect 2εM-equilibrium, where
M = max{|ri (t)| | i, t ∈ N }.
Let y ∈ N and let σ y be a strategy for player y. Let σ denote the joint strategy
where player y uses strategy σ y and all players t = y use strategy π t . We will prove
that ψ py (σ ) ≤ ψ py (π) + 2εM for every path p.
3 The condition in Flesch and Predtetchinski (2015b) translates to a somewhat weaker condition in our
case.
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If there exists a mixed strategy for the deviating player such that he profits more
than 2εM , then there also exists a pure strategy for him with this property. Therefore,
we may further assume that σ y is a pure strategy.
Now, let p be an arbitrary path and suppose that play has developed along p.
Suppose further that strategy σ is used after p. We will prove that player y can profit
at most 2εM in expectation from this, compared to playing strategy π y .
For a path q with last(q) = y, say that σ deviates at q if σ y(q) and π y(q) are not
the same probability distributions. Say that player y deviates (during play according
to σ ) whenever play according to σ develops along a path q such that σ deviates at q.
We divide the proof in three cases, depending on the type and number of deviations
by player y after p. In each case, we bound the conditional expected reward of the
deviating player y, or we prove that the case has probability 0 of happening.
IIa: First assume that player y deviates a finite number of times and that, at the last
deviation, σ y assigns probability 1 to an action u ∈ A(y) that is assigned probability 0
in π y (hence the last deviation causes a revision of prescribed play).
If the plan gyu satisfies AD-i or AD-ii, then after y’s last deviation, play will resume
in default mode with prescription gyu . The plan gyu was selected such that φy(gyu) =
β(y, u, α∗). By definition of δ(y, α∗), we have β(y, u, α∗) ≤ δ(y, α∗), and by the
properties of α∗y , we have δ(y, α∗) = α∗y . It follows that the expected reward for player
y, after deviations, is φy(gyu) ≤ α∗y .
If the plan gyu violates both AD-i and AD-ii, then after y’s last deviation, play
will resume in threat mode according to the triple (gyu, vyu, x yu). Since no further
deviations will take place, plan gyu will be executed with probability 1 − ε and with
an expected average reward of at most α∗y for player y; plan vyu will be executed with
probability ε and with an expected average reward strictly less than α∗y for player y,
since y /∈ sat(vyu, α∗). Thus, the expected average reward for y, after deviations, is
strictly less than (1 − ε)α∗y + εα∗y = α∗y .
Let us now demonstrate that player y has an expected average reward of at least
α∗y −2εM if he follows π y . If y becomes first active during default mode, it means that
prescribed play is deterministic according to anα∗-viable plan, say g. Then y’s average
reward will be φy(g) and since y ∈ N(g), we have indeed φy(g) ≥ α∗y > α∗y − 2εM .
If player y becomes active during threat mode, then play is according one of the plans
gtu . If the first occurrence of player xtu comes before y on plan gtu , then there is
no chance of a switch to vtu anymore, and the average reward for player y will be
φy(gtu) ≥ α∗y > α∗y − 2εM . If the first occurrence of xtu comes after y or if xtu = y,
then there is probability 1 − ε that plan gtu will be executed, with an average reward
of at least α∗y for player y. There is also a probability of ε that vtu will be executed,
with an average reward of at least−M for player y. Thus indeed, the expected average
reward for player y is at least (1 − ε)α∗y − εM ≥ α∗y − 2εM .
IIb: Now assume that player y deviates a finite number of times after p, and that, at
the last deviation, player y chooses an action u ∈ A(y) that is played with positive
probability according to π (hence the last deviation does not cause a revision of
prescribed play). This implies that, at the last deviation by y, the game is in threat
mode, and that according to π , player y is supposed to use a lottery to determine his
action. Say that the game is in threat mode according to the triple (g, v, y).
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Notice that the player to cause a revision of play is never the one assigned the task
of performing a lottery in revised play. Therefore, player y did not deviate in the period
between the stage at the end of p and the stage at which he is supposed to perform
the lottery. So, the last deviation of y is in fact his only deviation in the relevant time
period, and after p, play is in threat mode according to (g, v, y). We conclude that the
expected average reward for y by following π is (1 − ε)φy(g) + εφy(v).
Since we assume that the last deviation of y has positive probability under π ,
there are precisely two possibilities for that action. If player y deviates by choosing
continuation of g (with probability 1, as σ y is pure), then plan g will be executed
entirely (with probability 1) and the average reward for player y, after deviations, is
φy(g). If player y deviates by choosing first(v), then plan v will be executed with
probability 1 and the average reward for player y, after deviations, is φy(v). In both
cases, the reward is bounded by φy(g), since φy(v) < α∗y ≤ φy(g).
For this case, it now remains to see that φy(g) ≤ (1 − ε)φy(g) + εφy(v) + 2εM .
Indeed, we have
φy(g) = (1 − ε)φy(g) + εφy(v) + ε(φy(g) − φy(v))
≤ (1 − ε)φy(g) + εφy(v) + 2εM.
IIc: Let us finally investigate the possibility that player y deviates infinitely many
times. As this implies infinite play along non-absorbing states, the average reward to all
players will be zero if this happens. If α∗y ≥ 0, then player y will profit at most 2εM , as
hewill receive at leastα∗y−2εM by sticking to the plan. Sowe can assume thatα∗y < 0.
Notice that, if player y deviates infinitely many times, he causes infinitely many times
a revision of prescribed play. Each time at such a revision, it will be checked if the plan
gyu satisfiesAD-i orAD-ii, whereu is the state towhich y deviates. By the choice of gyu
as aminimizer for β(y, u, α∗), we have φy(gyu) = β(y, u, α∗) ≤ δ(y, α∗) = α∗y < 0.
This implies that gyu is an absorbing plan. Also, since y will deviate again, we must
have y ∈ N(gyu). This means that AD-i is violated, and clearly AD-ii is violated too,
by our assumption α∗y < 0. Thus, only AD-iii is satisfied, and play will resume in
threat mode according to the triple (gyu, vyu, x yu).
We conclude that, in the event that σ deviates infinitely many times during play and
α∗y < 0, play will enter threat mode infinitely many times. Each time that play enters
threat mode, there is probability ε that a switch to one of the plans vyu is made. Thus,
with probability 1, such a switch is eventuallymade.Notice that after the switch, player
y will not become active again, since y /∈ sat(vyu, α∗), and therefore y /∈ N(vyu).
This directly contradicts that player y deviates infinitely many times. We thus see that
the event of infinitely many deviations during play has probability 0 if α∗y < 0.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.1.
Example 2.3 For game I, a fixed point α∗1 = 2 and α∗2 = −1 was calculated in Exam-
ple 2.2. All α∗-viable plans absorb at 2, so we define g1 = g21 = (1, 2, 2∗, 2∗, . . .)
and g2 = g12 = (2, 2∗, 2∗, . . .). Plan g12 is (1, 2, α∗)-admissible, since it satisfies
bothAD-i andAD-ii. Plan g21 is (2, 1, α∗)-admissible, since it satisfiesAD-iii. In order
to complete our choices, we choose player 1 in the role of ‘threat-player’ x21 and plan
(1∗, 1∗, . . .) in the role of ’threat-plan’ v21 = (1∗, 1∗, . . .).
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Fig. 2 Update procedure may
fail if a player controls multiple
states
With these choices, the proof of Theorem 2.1 now prescribes absorption at 2 when-
ever player 2 is active (execute either g2 or g12). If the game starts at 1, then player 1
is initially supposed to announce 2 with probability 1 (execute g1). Every next time
he becomes active, player 1 is supposed to announce 2 (execute g21) with probability
1 − ε and to absorb at 1 (execute plan v21) with probability ε. (Player 2 apparently
refused to absorb at 2, and play is now in threat mode.)
For game II, the fixed point is α∗1 = 0 and α∗2 = 0. Here, only the two non-
absorbing plans (1, 2, 1, 2, . . .) and (2, 1, 2, 1, . . .) are α∗-viable.We therefore choose
g1 = (1, 2, 1, 2, . . .) and g2 = (1, 2, 1, 2, . . .). We do not make any further choices.
(Since it is not a deviation to announce the other player, it is unnecessary to choose
the plans g21 and g12).
With these choices, the proof of theorem 2.1 now prescribes the players to always
announce each other, indefinitely. Deviation from the plan means absorption, which
is indeed not profitable for the deviating player. unionsq
Of the restrictions imposed on our class G of games, the requirement that each
player control just one non-absorbing state seems especially severe. The following
example is to demonstrate that at least one specific attempt to deal with multiple states
per player does not work.
Example 2.4 The update procedure could be applied to the 1-player game in figure 2,
as if the two states were controlled by two different players, say 1 and 1′. If we initiate
the update procedure with αt = −1 for t = 1, 1′, then we find that α is in fact a fixed
point. The construction of theorem 2.1 then allows, for any ε > 0, for the strategy
profile in which player 1 absorbs immediately with probability 1, in any subgame. So
clearly, the construction of Theorem 2.1 fails here. ♦
3 Semi-stable vectors and their properties
The purpose of this section is to provide a sufficient condition for α ∈ RN that
guarantees the existence of a (t, u, α)-admissible plan for every t ∈ N and every
u ∈ A(t).
For α ∈ RN , t ∈ N and u ∈ S, let us say that t is α-safe at u if u ∈ A(t) and if
t ∈ sat(g, α) for all g ∈ viable(u, α). For t∗ ∈ N∗, it will be convenient to say that
t∗ is α-safe at t∗. We define, for all t ∈ S,
safestep(t, α) = {u ∈ A(t) | t isα − safe at u}.
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For α ∈ RN and X ⊆ N , we define
pos(X, α) = {x ∈ X | αx > 0},
esc(X, α) = {x ∈ X | ∃y ∈ S\X : y ∈ safestep(x, α)}.
We also define
C = {X ⊆ N | A(x) ∩ X = ∅ for all x ∈ X},
and for α ∈ RN , we define
P(α) = {X ⊆ N | pos(X, α) = ∅},
E(α) = {X ⊆ N | esc(X, α) ∩ pos(X, α) = ∅}, and
X (α) = P(α) ∩ E(α) ∩ C.
We say that an edge e = (x, y) is an α-exit from X if x ∈ X and y ∈ S\X , and if,
for all g ∈ viable(y, α),
esc(X, α) ⊆ sat(g, α) ⇒ x ∈ sat(g, α).
We say that e is a trivial α-exit from X if x ∈ esc(X, α) and a non-trivial one if
x ∈ X\esc(X, α).
We now say that α ∈ RN is semi-stable if safestep(x, α) = ∅ for all x ∈ N , and
if there exists a non-trivial α-exit from X for every X ∈ X (α). The set of semi-stable
vectors in RN is denoted by .
Example 3.1 Let us illustrate the definitions of this section with the 4-player game
depicted above. Notice that X = {1, 2} is the unique element of C, and thus the only
candidate for an element of X (α) = P(α) ∩ E(α) ∩ C.
For ρ = (−1, 1, 0, 0), we have 2 ∈ pos(X, ρ) ∩ esc(X, ρ), hence X /∈ E(ρ).
Thus, X (ρ) = ∅. Then trivially, for every set in Y ∈ X (α), there exists a non-trivial
ρ-exit from Y . As safestep(t, ρ) ⊇ {(t, t∗)} = ∅ for all t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, we see that
ρ = (−1, 1, 0, 0) is semi-stable in a trivial manner.
For α = (−1, 2, 0, 0), we have pos(X, α) = {2} = ∅, hence X ∈ P(α). We further
have pos(X, α) ∩ esc(X, α) = {2} ∩ {1} = ∅, hence X ∈ E(α). Thus, X (α) = {X}.
Let us verify that the edge (2, 3) is a non-trivial α-exit from X . Notice that the
plan (3, 4, 4∗, 4∗, . . .) is the only plan v ∈ viable(3, α) that satisfies the condition
esc(X, α) ⊆ sat(v, α), as it is the only plan in viable(3, α) that α-satisfies player 1.
We see that also player 2 is α-satisfied by the plan (3, 4, 4∗, 4∗, . . .). Therefore, we
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have, for all v ∈ viable(3, α): esc(X, α) ⊆ sat(v, α) ⇒ 2 ∈ sat(v, α). Then
indeed, (2, 3) is a non-trivial α-exit from X , as also the condition 2 ∈ X\esc(X, α)
and 3 ∈ S\X is satisfied. It can further be checked that safestep(t, α) = ∅ for all
t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Thus, α = (−1, 2, 0, 0) is semi-stable.
For ω = (0, 2, 0, 0), we have pos(X, ω) = {2} = ∅ and pos(X, ω)∩ esc(X, ω) =
{2} ∩ ∅ = ∅, hence X ∈ E(ω). Thus, X (ω) = {X}. Here, plan v = (3, 3∗, 3∗, . . .)
satisfies the trivial condition ∅ = esc(X, ω) ⊆ sat(v, ω) and violates the condition
2 ∈ sat(v, ω), hence the implication esc(X, ω) ⊆ sat(v, ω) ⇒ 2 ∈ sat(v, ω) is
violated. Therefore, the edge (2, 3) is not an ω-exit from X. One can check that the
edges (2, 2∗) and (1, 1∗) are no ω-exits from X either. Then, there does not exist a
(non-trivial) ω-exit from X. The vector ω = (0, 2, 0, 0) is therefore not semi-stable.
Remark The vector α = (−1, 2, 0, 0) can be obtained by updating player 2 with
respect to the vector ρ = (−1, 1, 0, 0). The updated value of 2 for player 2 can be
associated with action 1 ∈ A(2), followed by the minimizing (2, 1, ρ)-admissible
plan (1, 2, 3, 4, 4∗, 4∗, . . .). We see that, under the logic of the updating procedure, it
is in this example smart for player 2 to announce state 1 before possibly announcing
another state at a later stage of the game, as this will prevent possible absorption at 3.
We see in this example also how the update from ρ toα naturally creates an α-exit from
X . ♦
Lemma 3.1 We have ρ ∈ ,where ρ is the vector defined by ρt = rt (t) for all t ∈ N.
Proof For the vector ρ, we have t∗ ∈ safestep(t, ρ) for all t ∈ N . Hence,
safestep(t, ρ) = ∅ for all t ∈ N .
For any X ⊆ N , we have esc(X, ρ) = X , since t∗ ∈ safestep(t, ρ) for all
t ∈ X . Now, let X ∈ P(ρ), i.e. let X ⊆ N be such that pos(X, ρ) = ∅. Then
esc(X, ρ) ∩ pos(X, ρ) = pos(X, ρ) = ∅, hence X /∈ E(ρ). It follows that X (ρ) =
P(ρ)∩E(ρ)∩C = ∅. Then trivially, a non-trivialρ-exit from X exists for all X ∈ X (ρ).
Thus, ρ ∈ . unionsq
Lemma 3.2 Let α ∈ . Then esc(X, α) = ∅ for all X ∈ P(α).
Proof Let X ∈ P(α) and suppose that esc(X, α) = ∅. Then safestep(x, α) ⊆ X
for all x ∈ X , and thus, safestep(x, α) ⊆ A(x) ∩ X for all x ∈ X . We further have
safestep(x, α) = ∅ for all x ∈ X , by the fact that α ∈ . It follows that A(x)∩ X ⊇
safestep(x, α) = ∅ for all x ∈ X , which proves that X ∈ C. We also trivially have
X ∈ E(α), since we suppose esc(X, α) = ∅. Then X ∈ P(α) ∩ E(α) ∩ C = X (α).
Now, since α ∈  and X ∈ X (α), there exists a non-trivial α-exit from X , say (x, y).
Since (x, y) is an α-exit from X , we have for all v ∈ viable(y, α),
esc(X, α) ⊆ sat(v, α) ⇒ x ∈ sat(v, α).
The leftside of the implication is always true, since supposedly esc(X, α) = ∅. It
follows that x ∈ sat(v, α) for all v ∈ viable(y, α), hence y ∈ safestep(x, α). But
this implies x ∈ esc(X, α), which contradicts that esc(X, α) = ∅. unionsq
For any subgraph H of G and a subset X of the vertex set V (H) of H , say that X
is an ergodic set of H if
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(i) for all x, y ∈ X , there exists a path p in H from x to y with N(p) ⊆ X , and
(ii) for all x ∈ X and y ∈ V (H)\X , there is no path in H from x to y.
The following lemma is an easy result in graph theory. It is stated without proof.
Lemma 3.3 Let H = (V (H), E(H)) be a (directed) graph, such that for every vertex
x ∈ V (H), there exists y ∈ V (H) with (x, y) ∈ E(H). Then, for every x ∈ V (H),
there is a path from x to an element of an ergodic set of H.
For α ∈ , define the graph G(α) as the graph with vertex set S and edge set
{(x, y) ∈ E | y ∈ safestep(x, α)}. Notice that, for all α ∈  and for all t∗ ∈ N∗, the
singleton {t∗} is an ergodic set of the graph G(α), since (t∗, t∗) is a path in G(α) from
t∗ to t∗ and since there is no edge leaving the set {t∗}. The definition of ergodic set
implies that different ergodic sets of a graph are disjoint. Therefore, any ergodic set of
G(α) is either a singleton from the set N∗ or a subset of N . The following corollary
follows directly from Lemma 3.2.
Corollary 3.4 Let α ∈ . If X ⊆ N is an ergodic set of G(α), then pos(X, α) = ∅.
An immediate insight from Corollary 3.4 is that, for all α ∈ , a non-absorbing
plan v is α-viable if N(v) is a subset of an ergodic set of G(α).
Lemma 3.5 Let α ∈ , let p be a path in G(α), and let g be an α-viable plan such
that first(g) = last(p). Then the plan 〈p, g〉 is α-viable.
Proof Write p = (zi )ki=1 with k ≥ 1. Define, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the plan gi =〈(zi , . . . , zk), g〉. We prove by induction on i that all plans gi with i ∈ {1, . . . , k} are
α-viable. Trivially, the plan gk = g is α-viable. Now assume that gi+1 is α-viable
with i < k. Then N(gi )\{zi } ⊆ N(gi+1) ⊆ sat(gi+1, α) = sat(gi , α). Thus, to
prove that N(gi ) ⊆ sat(gi , α), i.e. to prove that gi is α-viable, it suffices to show that
zi ∈ sat(gi , α).
We have zi+1 ∈ safestep(zi , α), since p is a path in G(α). It follows that
zi ∈ sat(gi+1, α), since gi+1 is an α-viable plan with first(gi+1) = zi+1. Because
sat(gi , α) = sat(gi+1, α), we indeed obtain zi ∈ sat(gi , α), unionsq
The existence of α-viable plans for α ∈  is now an easy consequence of previous
results.
Lemma 3.6 Let α ∈ . Then, for all t ∈ N , a plan g in G(α) exists with g ∈
viable(t, α).
Proof Let t ∈ N . We have safestep(x, α) = ∅ for all x ∈ N , since α ∈ . Thus,
the graph G(α) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.3. Therefore, there is a path p
in G(α) from t to an element x of an ergodic set X of G(α). By the properties of
an ergodic set, a path q in G(α) exists from x to x , and with N(q) ⊆ X . First we
prove that the plan 〈q, q, . . .〉 is α-viable. Indeed, this is true by definition if the plan
〈q, q, . . .〉 is absorbing, i.e. if x ∈ N∗ and q = (x, x). Otherwise, we have X ⊆ N ,
and pos(X, α) = ∅ follows by Corollary 3.4. The plan 〈q, q, . . .〉 is then α-viable,
due to the fact that it is non-absorbing, hence it gives average reward 0 to all players.
Finally, it follows that g := 〈p, q, q, . . .〉 ∈ viable(t, α), by Lemma 3.5. unionsq
The main result of this section concerns the existence of admissible plans.
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Lemma 3.7 Letα ∈ . Then, for all t ∈ N and for all u ∈ A(t),admiss(t, u, α) = ∅.
Proof Let t ∈ N and u ∈ A(t). By Lemma 3.6, viable(u, α) = ∅. If v ∈
viable(u, α) exists with t /∈ N(v), then v ∈ admiss(t, u, α) since v satisfies AD-
i, and we are done. Assume further that t ∈ N(v) for all v ∈ viable(u, α). Notice
that this implies t ∈ sat(v, α) for all v ∈ viable(u, α). Thus, u ∈ safestep(t, α),
i.e. (t, u) is an edge of G(α).
Define
Y = {y ∈ S | a path p inG(α) from u to y exists with t /∈ N(p)},
and define X = Y ∪ {u, t}. We claim that esc(X, α) ⊆ {t}. To prove our claim, we
let x ∈ X\{t}, and we will show that y ∈ X for all y ∈ safestep(x, α). So, let
y ∈ safestep(x, α). If y = t , then trivially y ∈ X . If y = t , then there is a path in
G(α) from u to y not containing t . Indeed, if x = u, then (x, y) = (u, y) is such a
path, and if x = u, then there is a path p in G(α) from u to x not containing t by the
fact that x ∈ X\{t, u} ⊆ Y , and 〈p, (x, y)〉 is then a path in G(α) from u to y not
containing t . Thus, y ∈ Y ⊆ X as claimed. We now distinguish between the cases
pos(X, α) = ∅ and pos(X, α) = ∅.
First assume that pos(X, α) = ∅. Notice that, for all x ∈ X , an element y ∈ X
exists, such that (x, y) is an edge of G(α). In particular also, (t, u) is an edge of
G(α). Then it is possible to construct a non-absorbing plan g with first(g) = u,
with N(g) ⊆ X , and such that every edge of g is in the edge-set of G(α). Then
g ∈ viable(u, α) by the assumption that pos(X, α) = ∅, and by the fact that a non-
absorbing plan gives reward 0 to all players. Since the non-absorbing plan g satisfies
condition AD-i, it also follows that g ∈ admiss(t, u, α).
Now assume that pos(X, α) = ∅, i.e. assume that X ∈ P(α). We then have
esc(X, α) = ∅ by Lemma 3.2, so we must have esc(X, α) = {t}. If t ∈ pos(X, α),
then admiss(t, u, α) = viable(u, α) = ∅, where the equality is by the fact that AD-ii
is satisfied by all plans in viable(u, α) and the inequality is by Lemma 3.6. So we
can further assume that t /∈ pos(X, α). Under this assumption, we have esc(X, α) ∩
pos(X, α) = ∅, i.e. X ∈ E(α). We also have that A(x) ∩ X = ∅ for all x ∈ X , which
follows from our earlier observation that, for all x ∈ X , an element y ∈ X exists, such
that (x, y) is an edge of G(α). Thus, we have X ∈ C.
We see that X ∈ P(α) ∩ E(α) ∩ C = X (α). Then, by the fact that α ∈ , a
non-trivial α-exit from X exists, say (x, y). By definition of an α-exit, we have, for
all g ∈ viable(y, α),
esc(X, α) ⊆ sat(g, α) ⇒ x ∈ sat(g, α).
Since esc(X, α) = {t}, this translates to, for all g ∈ viable(y, α),
t ∈ sat(g, α) ⇒ x ∈ sat(g, α).
We have x ∈ X\esc(X, α), since the α-exit (x, y) is non-trivial. This implies y /∈
safestep(x, α), since y ∈ S\X . Thus, we can choose v ∈ viable(y, α) with x /∈
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sat(v, α). We must then also have t /∈ sat(v, α), since t ∈ sat(v, α) ⇒ x ∈
sat(v, α).
We choose z ∈ S such that (x, z) is an edge of G(α), which is possible by the fact
that α ∈ . Notice that x ∈ X\{t}. Indeed, we have x = t , since x ∈ X\esc(X, α)
and t ∈ esc(X, α). It follows that z ∈ Y ∪ {t} ⊆ X by the properties of the set Y .
We also choose h ∈ viable(z, α), which is possible by Lemma 3.6.
Now, in case x = u, we define g := 〈(x, z), h〉. In case x ∈ X\{u}, we actually have
x ∈ X\{u, t} ⊆ Y , and we can choose a path q in G(α) from u to x with t /∈ N(p).
We then define g := 〈q, (x, z), h〉. We claim that g ∈ admiss(t, u, α).
By Lemma 3.5, we have g ∈ viable(u, α). Notice that the first occurrence of x in
this plan is before the first occurrence of t . Moreover, we have y ∈ A(x) and a plan
v ∈ viable(y, α) with t, x /∈ sat(v, α). Also notice that first(v) = y and the state
z, which follows the first occurrence of x in g, are different states, since y ∈ S\X
and z ∈ X . This demonstrates that g satisfies condition AD-iii of admissibility, hence
g ∈ admiss(t, u, α). unionsq
Corollary 3.8 Let α ∈  and let t ∈ N. Then αt ≤ δ(t, α) < ∞.
Proof We have safestep(t, α) = ∅, by the fact that α ∈ . We can then choose
u ∈ safestep(t, α), and we obtain αt ≤ β(t, u, α) ≤ δ(t, α). By Lemma 3.7, the
minimization β(t, u, α) = min{φt (v) | v ∈ admiss(t, u, α)} is done over a non-
empty set, hence β(t, u, α) is finite for all u ∈ A(t), which demonstrates that δ(t, α) <
∞. unionsq
Lemma 3.9 Let α ∈  and t ∈ N. Let δ be the vector that results from α when
coordinate αt is replaced with δ(t, α). Then
(i) viable(u, δ) ⊆ viable(u, α) for all u ∈ N,
(ii) safestep(u, δ) ⊇ safestep(u, α) for all u ∈ N\{t},
(iii) B(t, α) ⊆ safestep(t, δ) ⊆ safestep(t, α),
(iv) esc(X, α)\{t} ⊆ esc(X, δ)\{t} for all X ⊆ N,
(v) esc(X, α) ⊆ esc(X, δ) for all X ⊆ N with t /∈ X or t ∈ esc(X, δ).
Proof Proof of (i): By Corollary 3.8 we have δ ≥ α. Then, if a plan is δ-viable, it is
obviously also α-viable.
Proof of (ii): Let u ∈ N\{t}, and let x ∈ safestep(u, α). Choose an arbitrary plan
g ∈ viable(x, δ). Then g ∈ viable(x, α) by (i), and since x ∈ safestep(u, α), it
follows that u ∈ sat(g, α). Since u = t , we have αu = δu , hence u ∈ sat(g, δ). It
follows that x ∈ safestep(u, δ).
Proof of (iii), part 1: Let u ∈ B(t, α). Choose g ∈ viable(u, δ). To prove that
u ∈ safestep(t, δ), it suffices to show that t ∈ sat(g, δ). Case 1: If t /∈ N(g), then
g ∈ admiss(t, u, α), since g is α-viable by Lemma 3.9-(i) and satisfies condition AD-
i. Then φt (g) ≥ β(t, u, α) = δ(t, α), where the inequality follows by the definition
of β(t, u, α), and the equality follows by the choice of u ∈ B(t, α). So indeed,
t ∈ sat(g, δ). Case 2: If t ∈ N(g), then t ∈ sat(g, δ) follows immediately from the
definition of a δ-viable plan.
Proof of (iii), part 2: Now let u ∈ safestep(t, δ). Choose g ∈ viable(u, α).
We need to show that t ∈ sat(g, α). Case 1: If t /∈ N(g), then g ∈ viable(u, δ),
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since αx = δx for all x ∈ N(g). By the fact that u ∈ safestep(t, δ), it follows that
t ∈ sat(g, δ). Then also t ∈ sat(g, α), since αt ≤ δt . Case 2: If t ∈ N(g), then
t ∈ sat(g, α) is trivial.
Proof of (iv): This follows immediately from (ii).
Proof of (v): If t /∈ X , then
esc(X, α) = esc(X, α)\{t} ⊆ esc(X, δ)\{t} = esc(X, δ).
If t ∈ esc(X, δ), then
esc(X, α) ⊆ {t} ∪ (esc(X, α)\{t}) ⊆ {t} ∪ (esc(X, δ)\{t}) = esc(X, δ).
unionsq
Corollary 3.10 Let α ∈ , let t ∈ N, and let δ be the vector that results from α when
coordinate αt is replaced with δ(t, α). Then safestep(x, δ) = ∅ for all x ∈ N.
Proof For all x ∈ N\{t}, we have safestep(x, δ) ⊇ safestep(x, α) = ∅, where the
inclusion follows from Lemma 3.9-(ii), and the inequality follows from the fact that
α ∈ . We also have safestep(t, δ) ⊇ B(t, α) = ∅, where the inclusion follows
from Lemma 3.9-(iii). unionsq
4 Stable vectors and their properties
In the previous section we showed that for all α ∈ , the updated vector, say δ(α),
is finite and satisfies δ(α) ≥ α. If we could also prove δ(α) ∈  for all α ∈ , then
it would be an easy corollary to establish a ‘fixed point’ in , i.e. the existence of a
vector α∗ ∈  with the property δ(t, α∗) = α∗t for all t ∈ N .
We begin this section with an example of α ∈  and δ(α) /∈ . The example
demonstrates that, if we initiate the updating process with a vector in , the process
may terminate with a vector that is not finite.
This ‘negative result’ will motivate the rather intricate definition of the set ∗ of
stable vectors, later in this section. The set ∗ will be a subset of , so that all results
derived in Sect. 3 will also hold for all α ∈ ∗. Most importantly however, we will be
able to prove that δ(α) ∈ ∗ for all α ∈ ∗.
Example 4.1 For the game depicted in Fig. 3, let us set α1 = 2 and α2 = α3 =
α4 = α5 = 0. We claim that α is semi-stable: It is easy to verify that the condition
safestep(x, α) = ∅ for all x ∈ N is satisfied. Moreover, the collection X (α) consists
of only the set {1, 2, 3}, and one can verify that the edge (3, 4) is a non-trivial α-exit
from {1, 2, 3}.
Corollary 3.8 now predicts that any update on α will be finite. However, the vector
that results after the update of the state controlled by player 4 is not semi-stable. The
updated vector, say α˜, is given by α˜1 = α˜4 = 2 and α˜2 = α˜3 = α˜5 = 0. Observe now
that {1, 2, 3} ∈ X (α˜) and that 3 ∈ esc({1, 2, 3}, α˜). Thus, the edge (3, 4) is a trivial
α˜-exit from {1, 2, 3}. As there is no other serious candidate for a non-trivial α˜-exit
from {1, 2, 3}, we conclude that α˜ is not semi-stable.
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Fig. 3 Update of a semi-stable
vector may not be semi-stable
Any update on α˜ is still finite, even though Corollary 3.8 does not apply. However,
two consecutive updates of the vector α˜ will result in a vector that is not finite anymore.
If we first update the state controlled by 3, then its new value will be β(3, 1, α˜) = 1:
indeed, any α˜-viable planwith initial state 1 andwith a reward lower than 1 for player 3
must absorb at 5, which is not (3, 1, α˜)-admissible. If we subsequently update the state
controlled by 2, we see that there are no (2, 3)-admissible plans anymore, hence the
value of 2 becomes infinite. The reader may wish to verify that a different order of
updates does not solve the problem. unionsq
Let α ∈ , X ⊆ N and Z ⊆ X . We say that an edge (x, y) is an (α, Z)–exit from
X if x ∈ X and y ∈ S\X , and if, for all v ∈ viable(y, α),
Z ∪ esc(X, α) ⊆ sat(v, α) ⇒ x ∈ sat(v, α).
We say that a sequence of edges e = (xi , yi )ki=1 is an α-exit sequence from X if, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the edge (xi , yi ) is an (α, {x1, . . . , xi−1})–exit from X . For technical
reasons, we allow k = 0, i.e. the empty sequence will also be called an α-exit sequence
from X . We say that the α-exit sequence from X is trivial if xi ∈ esc(X, α) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We say that it is non-trivial if the sequence is non-empty and if there
exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that xi ∈ X\esc(X, α). We say that the α-exit sequence
from X is positive if the sequence is non-empty and if there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such
that xi ∈ pos(X, α).
We now say that a vector α ∈ RN is stable if safestep(x, α) = ∅ for all x ∈ N
and if a positive α-exit sequence from X exists for all X ∈ X (α). We denote the set
of stable vectors in RN by ∗.
Example 4.2 Let us illustrate the definitions of this section with the 3-player game in
Fig. 4. Notice that X = {1, 2, 3} is the unique element of C, and thus the only candidate
for an element of X (α) = P(α) ∩ E(α) ∩ C.
We set α = (0, 2,−1). Then we have pos(X, α) = {2} = ∅, hence X ∈ P(α).
We further have pos(X, α) ∩ esc(X, α) = {2} ∩ {3} = ∅, hence X ∈ E(α). Thus,
X (α) = {X}.
Let us first verify that the edge (1, 1∗) is a non-trivial α-exit from X . We need to
check that, for all v ∈ viable(1∗, α), we have {3} = esc(X, α) ⊆ sat(v, α) ⇒ 1 ∈
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Fig. 4 Illustration of an α-exit
sequence and stability
sat(v, α). The only plan in viable(1∗, α) is g = (1∗, 1∗, . . .), and we have indeed
{3} ⊆ sat(g, α) ⇒ 1 ∈ sat(g, α), since player 3 is not α-satisfied by plan g. Then
(1, 1∗) is a non-trivial α-exit from X , as also the condition 1 ∈ X\esc(X, α) and
1∗ ∈ S\X is satisfied.
Let us next verify that the edge (2, 2∗) is an (α, {1})-exit from X . We need to check
that, for all v ∈ viable(2∗, α), we have {1, 3} = {1}∪esc(X, α) ⊆ sat(v, α) ⇒ 2 ∈
sat(v, α). The only plan in viable(2∗, α) is g = (2∗, 2∗, . . .), and we have indeed
{1, 3} ⊆ sat(g, α) ⇒ 2 ∈ sat(g, α), since player 1 is not α-satisfied by plan g. Then
(2, 2∗) is an (α, {1})-exit from X .
We see that ((1, 1∗)) and ((1, 1∗), (2, 2∗)) are both non-trivial α-exit sequences
from X . The latter sequence is a positive α-exit sequence from X . It follows that the
vector α = (0, 2,−1) is stable, since also the condition safestep(t, α) = ∅ for all
t ∈ {1, 2, 3} is satisfied.
Remark The vector α = (0, 2,−1) can be obtained in two updates from the
vector ρ = (−1, 1,−1) (the vector defined by ρt = rt (t) for all t ∈ N ). In
the example, each update adds to the edge-sequence from X , which is typically
what happens if an element t ∈ X is updated and if B(t, α) ⊆ X. In Exam-
ple 4.1, we saw how an α-exit from X can disappear by an update of t /∈ X.
However, such an update outside X cannot make a positive α-exit sequence disappear.
♦
The following lemma states some elementary facts about exit sequences.
Lemma 4.1 Let X ⊆ N and let α ∈ .
(i) If e is a non-empty α-exit sequence from X, then its first edge is an α-exit from X.
(ii) If e is an α-exit sequence from X, and if (x, y) is an edge of ewith x ∈ esc(X, α),
then the sequence e obtained from e by deleting the edge (x, y) is also an α-
exit sequence from X. Moreover, if e is a positive α-exit sequence from X and if
X ∈ X (α), then e is also a positive α-exit sequence from X.
(iii) If a non-trivial α-exit sequence from X exists, then a non-trivial α-exit from X
exists.
(iv) If e and f are both α-exit sequences from X, then the concatenation of these two
sequences, denoted by (e, f), is also an α-exit sequence from X. If moreover, e
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or f is a positive α-exit sequence from X, then also (e, f) is a positive α-exit
sequence from X.
(v) If e is a positive α-exit sequence from X and if X ∈ X (α), then e is non-trivial.
Proof Proof of (i): If e is a non-empty α-exit sequence from X , then its first edge is
by definition an (α,∅)–exit from X . That is also the definition of an α-exit from X .
Proof of (ii): Let e = (xi , yi )ki=1 be an α-exit sequence from X . Suppose h ∈{1, . . . , k} is such that xh ∈ esc(X, α). Then we have, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, that
{x1, . . . , x j−1} ∪ esc(X, α) = {x1, . . . , x j−1}\{xh} ∪ esc(X, α).
Now, by the definition of an (α,Y )–exit from X and by the fact that (x j , y j ) is an
(α, {x1, . . . , x j−1})–exit from X , it follows that edge (x j , y j ) is an (α, {x1, . . . , x j−1}\
{xh})–exit from X , for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}; thus also for all j = h. This means that
the sequence e, obtained from e by deleting edge (xh, yh) from it, is also an α-exit
sequence from X .
Moreover, if X ∈ X (α), then esc(X, α) ∩ pos(X, α) = ∅. So in this case we have
xh /∈ pos(X, α), and it follows that the sequence e is positive if e is positive.
Proof of (iii): Let e = (xi , yi )ki=1 be a non-trivial α-exit sequence from X . Let h be
the smallest index with xh ∈ X\esc(X, α). Denote by e the edge-sequence obtained
from e by deleting all edges (xi , yi ) from e with i < h. Then the edge-sequence e is
an α-exit sequence from X , by (ii). The first edge of e (i.e. (xh, yh)) is an α-exit from
X , by (i).
Proof of (iv): Let e = (xi , yi )ki=1 and f = (xi , yi )i=k+1 be two α-exit sequences
from X . We need to prove that (xi , yi )i=1 is an α-exit sequence from X . To see
this, let i ∈ {1, . . . , } and let v ∈ viable(yi , α) be such that {x1, . . . , xi−1} ∪
esc(X, α) ⊆ sat(v, α). If i ≤ k, we use the fact that (xi , yi ) is an (α, {x1, . . . , xi−1})–
exit from X to deduce that xi ∈ sat(v, α). If i > k, we use the fact that (xi , yi ) is an
(α, {xk+1, . . . , xi−1})–exit from X to deduce that xi ∈ sat(v, α).
If moreover, one of the sequences e or f is a positive α-exit sequence from X , then
one of these sequence contains an edge (x, y) with x ∈ pos(X, α). Obviously, (e, f)
also contains the edge (x, y), and is therefore a positive α-exit sequence from X .
Proof of (v): Let (xi , yi )ki=1 be a positive α-exit sequence from X ∈ X (α).
Thus, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k} with xi ∈ pos(X, α). Then xi /∈ esc(X, α), since
pos(X, α) ∩ esc(X, α) = ∅ by the fact that X ∈ X (α) ⊆ E(α). unionsq
Lemma 4.2 We have ρ ∈ ∗ ⊆ , where, ρ is the vector defined by ρt = rt (t) for
all t ∈ N.
Proof For thevectorρ,wedemonstrated in theproof ofLemma3.1 that safestep(t, ρ)
= ∅ for all t ∈ N . We also demonstrated that X (ρ) = ∅, so trivially, a positive ρ-exit
sequence from X exists for all X ∈ X (ρ). Thus, ρ ∈ ∗.
Since for X ∈ X (α), a positive α-exit sequence from X is non-trivial [by
Lemma 4.1-(v)], and since the existence of a non-trivial α-exit sequence from X
implies the existence of a non-trivial α-exit from X [by Lemma 4.1-(iii)], it follows
that any stable vector is also semi-stable. Thus, ∗ ⊆ . unionsq
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Let us fix α ∈ ∗ and t ∈ N . Let further δ denote the update of α, where αt is
replaced by δ(t, α). It follows from Lemma 4.2 and Corollary 3.10 that δ satisfies the
condition safestep(x, δ) = ∅ for all x ∈ N . In this section, we will demonstrate that
δ also has the property that a positive δ-exit sequence from X exists, for all X ∈ X (δ).
Let us partition the set X (δ) into two subsets.
V(t, δ) = {X ∈ X (δ) | t /∈ X or t ∈ esc(X, δ)},
W(t, δ) = {X ∈ X (δ) | t ∈ X\esc(X, δ)}.
We first deal with the set V(t, δ). We will prove that its elements are all present
in X (α), which implies the existence of a positive α-exit sequence from X for all
X ∈ V(t, δ), as α ∈ ∗. We then proceed by proving that, for all X ∈ V(t, δ), every
α-exit sequence from X is also a δ-exit sequence from X .
Lemma 4.3 We have V(t, δ) ⊆ X (α).
Proof Let X ∈ V(t, δ). We need to prove that X ∈ X (α) = P(α) ∩ E(α) ∩ C.
Proof that X ∈ P(α): We claim that t /∈ pos(X, δ). This is trivial if t /∈ X .
Otherwise, we have t ∈ esc(X, δ), since X ∈ V(t, δ). We also have esc(X, δ) ∩
pos(X, δ) = ∅, by the fact that X ∈ V(t, δ) ⊆ X (δ) ⊆ E(δ). Now t /∈ pos(X, δ)
follows from the combination of these facts.
Then pos(X, α) = pos(X, δ) = ∅, where the equality is by the fact that αx = δx
for all x ∈ X\{t} and the fact that αt ≤ δt ≤ 0.
Proof that X ∈ E(α): We have t /∈ X or t ∈ esc(X, δ) by the fact that X ∈ V(t, δ).
Then esc(X, α) ⊆ esc(X, δ) by Lemma 3.9-(v). It follows that
esc(X, α) ∩ pos(X, α) ⊆ esc(X, δ) ∩ pos(X, δ) = ∅,
where the inclusion is by the fact that esc(X, α) ⊆ esc(X, δ) and pos(X, α) =
pos(X, δ), and the equality is by the fact that X ∈ V(t, δ) ⊆ X (δ) ⊆ E(δ).
Proof that X ∈ C: Obviously, we have X ∈ C, since X ∈ V(t, δ) ⊆ X (δ) ⊆ C.
unionsq
Lemma 4.4 For X ∈ V(t, δ), every (positive) α-exit sequence from X is a (positive)
δ-exit sequence from X.
Proof Let X ∈ V(t, δ) and let e = (xi , yi )ki=1 be an α-exit sequence from X . Choose
j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let g ∈ viable(y j , δ) and assume that {x1, . . . , x j−1} ∪ esc(X, δ) ⊆
sat(g, δ). We will prove that x j ∈ sat(g, δ).
We have esc(X, α) ⊆ esc(X, δ) by Lemma 3.9-(v). Therefore,
{x1, . . . , x j−1} ∪ esc(X, α) ⊆ {x1, . . . , x j−1} ∪ esc(X, δ) ⊆ sat(g, δ) ⊆ sat(g, α).
Then x j ∈ sat(g, α), by the fact that (x j , y j ) is an (α, {x1, . . . , x j−1})–exit from
X , and by the fact that g ∈ viable(y j , δ) ⊆ viable(y j , α). If x j = t , then x j ∈
sat(g, δ) follows because αx j = δx j . If x j = t , then x j ∈ sat(g, δ) follows from the
assumption {x1, . . . , x j−1} ∪ esc(X, δ) ⊆ sat(g, δ) and the fact that t ∈ esc(X, δ).
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So indeed, e is a δ-exit sequence from X . If e is a positive α-exit sequence from
X , then e is also a positive δ-exit sequence from X , since there exists h ∈ {1, . . . , k}
with xh ∈ pos(X, α) ⊆ pos(X, δ). unionsq
Corollary 4.5 For all X ∈ V(t, δ), a positive δ-exit sequence from X exists.
We next deal with the set W(t, δ).
A short summary of the approach we will now take is as follows. We first define a
type of α-exit sequence from X , for X ∈ W(t, δ), that do not involve t in any way.
It easily follows from their definition that such sequences are also δ-exit sequences
from X . We then order these α-exit sequences from X disregarding t , by the number
of elements of X incident with an edge of the sequence. Now, let us denote a maximal
α-exit sequence from X disregarding t by e. Obviously, if e is a positive sequence,
then e itself is the required δ-exit sequence from X . Otherwise, the sequence e can
still serve as the initial part of a positive δ-exit sequence from X . Indeed, if t ∈
esc(X, α) ∩ pos(X, α), then we prove that there exists s ∈ A(t), such that (e, (t, s))
is the required positive δ-exit-sequence from X . If t /∈ esc(X, α) ∩ pos(X, α), then
we demonstrate that X ∈ X (α), in which case we can choose an appropriate α-exit
sequence f from X , such that (e, f) is the required positive δ-exit-sequence from X .
Now, let X ∈ W(t, δ) and let e = (xi , yi )ki=1 be an α-exit sequence from X . We
will say that e is an α-exit sequence from X disregarding t if t /∈ {x1, . . . , xk}, and if
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and all v ∈ viable(yi , α),
{x1, . . . , xi−1} ∪ (esc(X, α)\{t}) ⊆ sat(v, α) ⇒ xi ∈ sat(v, α).
Lemma 4.6 Let X ∈ W(t, δ). Then every (positive) α-exit sequence from X disre-
garding t is a (positive) δ-exit sequence from X.
Proof Let e = (xi , yi )ki=1 be an α-exit sequence from X disregarding t .
We prove that e is a δ-exit sequence from X . The requirement xi ∈ X and yi ∈ S\X
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} is obviously satisfied, because e is an α-exit sequence from X .
Now, let i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let g ∈ viable(yi , δ) and assume that {x1, . . . , xi−1} ∪
esc(X, δ) ⊆ sat(g, δ).
We have esc(X, α)\{t} ⊆ esc(X, δ) by Lemma 3.9-(iv). Therefore,
{x1, . . . , xi−1} ∪ (esc(X, α)\{t}) ⊆ {x1, . . . , xi−1} ∪ esc(X, δ) ⊆ sat(g, δ)
⊆ sat(g, α).
Then xi ∈ sat(g, α) follows by the fact that e is an α-exit sequence from X disre-
garding t . Also xi = t follows from that fact. The combination xi ∈ sat(g, α) and
xi = t implies xi ∈ sat(g, δ). So indeed, e is a δ-exit sequence from X .
If e is a positive α-exit sequence from X disregarding t , then e is a positive δ-exit
sequence from X , since there exists h ∈ {1, . . . , k}with xh ∈ pos(X, α) ⊆ pos(X, δ).
unionsq
In the following, if e = (xi , yi )ki=1 is a sequence of edges, we will use the notation
xi (e) = xi and yi (e) = yi for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We will also use the notation x(e) =
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{x1, . . . , xk}, y(e) = {y1, . . . , yk}, and k(e) = k. We will further use the notation ∅
for the empty sequence.
Let X ∈ W(t, δ) and let e be an α-exit sequence from X disregarding t . It will
be convenient to have terminology for an edge e = (x, y) such that (e, e) fails to be
an α-exit sequence from X disregarding t only because y ∈ X . Say that (x, y) is an
α-cap for (X, e, t) if x ∈ X\{t} and y ∈ X and if, for all v ∈ viable(y, α), we have
x(e) ∪ (esc(X, α)\{t}) ⊆ sat(v, α) ⇒ x ∈ sat(v, α).
We denote by F(X, e, t, α) the set of α-caps for (X, e, t). Notice that ∅ is an α-exit
sequence from X disregarding t , so F(X, ∅ , t, α) is well-defined.
Lemma 4.7 Let X ∈ W(t, δ). Then F(X, ∅ , t, α) = ∅. In particular,
(i) for every x ∈ X\(esc(X, α) ∪ {t}), we have
Ø = {(x, y) | y ∈ safestep(x, α)} ⊆ F(X, ∅ , t, α),
(ii) and for every x ∈ esc(X, α)\{t}, we have
Ø = {(x, y) | y ∈ A(x) ∩ X} ⊆ F(X, ∅ , t, α).
Proof Proof of (i): Let x ∈ X\(esc(X, α) ∪ {t}).
Non-emptiness of the set {(x, y) | y ∈ safestep(x, α)} follows from the fact that
α ∈ ∗.
Choose y ∈ safestep(x, α). We need to show that (x, y) ∈ F(X, ∅ , t, α). We
trivially have x ∈ X\{t}. The property y ∈ X follows, since x ∈ X\esc(X, α), which
is equivalent to safestep(x, α) ⊆ X .
Now let v ∈ viable(y, α) and assume that esc(X, α)\{t} ⊆ sat(v, α). The fact
that y ∈ safestep(x, α) implies x ∈ sat(v, α) by definition, which shows (x, y) ∈
F(X, ∅ , t, α). (Here, the assumption esc(X, α)\{t} ⊆ sat(v, α) was not needed.)
Proof of (ii): Let x ∈ esc(X, α)\{t}.
Non-emptiness of the set {(x, y) | y ∈ A(x) ∩ X} follows from the fact that
X ∈ W(t, δ) ⊆ C.
Choose y ∈ A(x) ∩ X . Then trivially x ∈ X\{t} and y ∈ X .
Now let v ∈ viable(y, α) and assume that esc(X, α)\{t} ⊆ sat(v, α). Here,
x ∈ sat(v, α) follows trivially from the assumption esc(X, α)\{t} ⊆ sat(v, α). unionsq
Lemma 4.8 Let X ∈ W(t, δ), and let e and f be two α-exit sequences from X
disregarding t with x(e) ⊆ x(f). Then F(X, e, t, α) ⊆ F(X, f, t, α).
Proof Let (x, y) ∈ F(X, e, t, α). Trivially, x ∈ X\{t} and y ∈ X . Now, let v ∈
viable(y, α) and assume that x(f)∪ (esc(X, α)\{t}) ⊆ sat(v, α). Then also x(e)∪
(esc(X, α)\{t}) ⊆ sat(v, α), since x(e) ⊆ x(f). Now, x ∈ sat(v, α) follows from
the fact that e is an α-exit sequence from X disregarding t . This demonstrates (x, y) ∈
F(X, f, t, α). unionsq
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We remark that Lemma 4.1 remains valid when every occurrence of the phrase
“sequence from X” in the lemma is replaced by the phrase “sequence from X dis-
regarding t”. The proof of this is completely analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.1.
In particular, the concatenation of two α-exit sequences from X disregarding t is an
α-exit sequence from X disregarding t . Since there exists at least one α-exit sequence
from X disregarding t for every X ∈ W(t, δ) (the empty sequence), it is obvious then
that, for every X ∈ W(t, δ), an α-exit sequence e∗ from X disregarding t exists such
that x(e) ⊆ x(e∗) for all α-exit sequences e from X disregarding t . Let us call e∗
with this property a maximal α-exit sequence from X disregarding t . The following
corollary now follows immediately from Lemma 4.8.
Corollary 4.9 Let X ∈ W(t, δ) and let e∗ be a maximal α-exit sequence from X
disregarding t. Then F(X, e, t, α) ⊆ F(X, e∗, t, α) for every α-exit sequence e from
X disregarding t.
For X ∈ W(t, δ) and an α-exit sequence e from X disregarding t , let us define
H(X, e, t, α) as the graph with vertex set X and edge set F(X, e, t, α) ∪ {(t, u) |
u ∈ B(t, α)}). Notice that this graph is well-defined. Indeed, for every edge in
F(X, e, t, α), the endpoints are by definition in X . For every edge in {(t, u) | u ∈
B(t, α)}, we have t ∈ X by the fact that X ∈ W(t, δ), and we have u ∈ X , since
u ∈ B(t, α) ⊆ safestep(t, δ) ⊆ X , where the first inclusion is by Lemma 3.9-(iii)
and the second inclusion is by the fact that t ∈ X\esc(X, δ).
Lemma 4.10 Let X ∈ W(t, δ), let e be an α-exit sequence from X disregarding t , let
p be a path in H(X, e, t, α), and let g ∈ viable(last(p), α). Then
x(e) ∪ (esc(X, α)\{t}) ⊆ sat(g, α) ⇒ 〈p, g〉 ∈ viable(first(p), α).
Proof Assume that x(e) ∪ (esc(X, α)\{t}) ⊆ sat(g, α). We write p = (zi )mi=1, and
we define gm = g and gi = 〈(zi , . . . , zm), g〉 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}.
Trivially, gm = g is α-viable. Now, let i ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} and assume that
gi+1 ∈ viable(zi+1, α). It follows immediately from (zi , zi+1) ∈ F(X, e, t, α)
and the assumption x(e) ∪ (esc(X, α)\{t}) ⊆ sat(g, α) = sat(gi+1, α) that
zi ∈ sat(gi+1, α). Thus, N(gi ) = {zi } ∪ N(gi+1) ⊆ sat(gi+1, α) = sat(gi , α).
This proves that gi is α-viable.
We proved by induction that gi is α-viable for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. In particular,
〈p, g〉 = g1 is α-viable. unionsq
Let X ∈ W(t, δ) and let e be an α-exit sequence from X disregarding t . Notice that,
for every x ∈ X , there exists y ∈ X such that (x, y) is an edge of H(X, e, t, α). This
follows directly from Lemma 4.7 and the fact that B(t, α) = ∅. Thus, by Lemma 3.3,
the graph H(X, e, t, α) has at least one ergodic set, and for every x ∈ X , there is a
path in H(X, e, t, α) from x to an ergodic set of H(X, e, t, α).
Lemma 4.11 Let X ∈ W(t, δ) and let e be an α-exit sequence from X disregarding
t such that x(e) ∩ pos(X, α) = ∅. Then H(X, e, t, α) has an ergodic set Y with
pos(Y, α) = ∅.
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Proof In the proof, we denote H(X, e, t, α) by H .
Assume that pos(Y, α) = ∅ for every ergodic set Y of H . We will demonstrate then
that pos(X, δ) = ∅. Let x ∈ X .
First consider the case that x is element of an ergodic set Y of H . Then obviously
αx ≤ 0, by the assumption that pos(Y, α) = ∅. If x = t , it follows immediately
that δx = αx ≤ 0. If x = t , we choose u ∈ B(t, α). Notice that u ∈ Y , since Y
is an ergodic set of H and (t, u) is an edge of H . We can therefore choose a non-
absorbing plan g with N(g) ⊆ Y (possible by the properties of an ergodic set) and
with first(g) = u (possible, since u ∈ Y ). Plan g is α-viable by the assumption that
pos(Y, α) = ∅. Then g is also (t, u, α)-admissible as it satisfies AD-i. It follows that
δt = δ(t, α) = β(t, u, α) ≤ φt (g) = 0.
Now consider the case that x is not an element of any ergodic set of H . Then choose
an ergodic set Y of H such that there exists a path p in H from x to an element of Y .
We also choose a non-absorbing plan g withN(g) ⊆ Y and with first(g) = last(p).
Plan g is α-viable by the assumption pos(Y, α) = ∅. We claim that plan 〈p, g〉 is also
α-viable.
Notice that x(e) ⊆ sat(g, α) by the assumption x(e) ∩ pos(X, α) = ∅. We also
have
(esc(X, α)\{t}) ∩ pos(X, α) ⊆ esc(X, δ) ∩ pos(X, δ) = ∅,
where the inclusion follows by esc(X, α)\{t} ⊆ esc(X, δ) [Lemma 3.9-(iv)] and
pos(X, α) ⊆ pos(X, δ), and the equality follows by the fact that X ∈ W(t, δ) ⊆
X (δ) ⊆ E(δ). Thus, esc(X, α)\{t} ⊆ sat(g, α). Then 〈p, g〉 is α-viable by
Lemma 4.10.
It follows that αx ≤ φx (〈p, g〉) = 0. If x = t , we obtain immediately δx = αx ≤ 0.
If x = t , consider the plan 〈p′, g〉, where p′ is the part of p that starts at the second
state of p. Clearly, the plan 〈p′, g〉 is α-viable. Then 〈p′, g〉 is also (t, first(p′), α)-
admissible as it satisfies AD-i. Further notice that first(p′) ∈ B(t, α). Thus, δt =
δ(t, α) = β(t, first(p′), α) ≤ φt (〈p′, g〉) = 0.
So, we have indeed pos(X, δ) = ∅. This contradicts X ∈ W(t, δ) ⊆ X (δ) ⊆ P(δ).
unionsq
Lemma 4.12 Let X ∈ W(t, δ), let e be an α-exit sequence from X disregarding t ,
and let Y be an ergodic set of H(X, e, t, α). Then
esc(Y, α)\{t} = (Y ∩ esc(X, α))\{t}.
Proof In the proof, we denote H(X, e, t, α) by H .
To see that esc(Y, α)\{t} ⊆ (Y ∩ esc(X, α))\{t}, let x ∈ esc(Y, α)\{t}. By def-
inition of the set esc(Y, α), we can choose y ∈ S\Y , such that y ∈ safestep(x, α).
Now suppose y ∈ X . Then, since x = t , (x, y) is an edge of H , which contradicts that
Y is an ergodic set of H . Therefore, x ∈ esc(X, α), hence x ∈ (Y ∩ esc(X, α))\{t}.
To see that esc(Y, α)\{t} ⊇ (Y ∩ esc(X, α))\{t}, let x ∈ (Y ∩ esc(X, α))\{t}. By
definition of the set esc(X, α), we can choose y ∈ S\X , such that y ∈ safestep(x, α).
Then obviously y ∈ S\Y , since Y ⊆ X . It follows that x ∈ esc(Y, α), since x ∈ Y .
Subsequently, it follows that x ∈ esc(Y, α)\{t}, since x = t . unionsq
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Lemma 4.13 Let X ∈ W(t, δ) and let e∗ be a maximal α-exit sequence from X
disregarding t. Then one of the following holds.
(i) e∗ is a positive α-exit sequence from X ,
(ii) for all v ∈ viable(t, α),
x(e∗) ∪ esc(X, α) ⊆ sat(v, α) ⇒ t ∈ sat(v, δ).
Proof If e∗ is a positive α-exit sequence from X , we are done. We assume from here
that this is not the case. Then Lemma 4.11 applies, and we can choose an ergodic set
Y of H = H(X, e∗, t, α) with pos(Y, α) = ∅.
A: We will first prove that t ∈ Y . Suppose that t /∈ Y .
A1: We claim that Y ∈ X (α). We trivially have Y ∈ P(α), and by the properties of
an ergodic set, we have Y ∈ C. It remains to prove that Y ∈ E(α).
We obviously have pos(Y, α) ⊆ pos(X, δ). We also have
esc(Y, α) = esc(Y, α)\{t} ⊆ esc(X, α)\{t} ⊆ esc(X, δ)\{t} ⊆ esc(X, δ).
Here, the equality is because t /∈ Y , the first inclusion is by Lemma 4.12, the second
inclusion follows by 3.9-(iv), and the third inclusion is trivial. We now conclude that
esc(Y, α) ∩ pos(Y, α) ⊆ esc(X, δ) ∩ pos(X, δ) = ∅,
where the equality is because X ∈ X (δ) ⊆ E(δ). This proves that Y ∈ E(α).
A2: Since Y ∈ X (α) and since α ∈ ∗, we can choose a positive α-exit sequence e
from Y . We claim that e is an α-exit sequence from X disregarding t .
We have x(e) ⊆ Y ⊆ X\{t}, where the first inclusion follows by the fact that e is
an α-exit sequence from Y , and the second inclusion is by the fact that Y ⊆ X and
t /∈ Y .
By definition of an α-exit sequence from Y , the sequence e satisfies, for all i ∈
{1, . . . , k(e)}, and all v ∈ viable(yi (e), α),
{x1(e), . . . , xi−1(e)} ∪ esc(Y, α) ⊆ sat(v, α) ⇒ xi (e) ∈ sat(v, α).
Wehave esc(Y, α) = esc(Y, α)\{t} ⊆ esc(X, α)\{t}, where the equality is by the fact
that t /∈ Y , and the inclusion is by Lemma 4.12. It follows that, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k(e)}
and all v ∈ viable(yi (e), α),
{x1(e), . . . , xi−1(e)} ∪ (esc(X, α)\{t}) ⊆ sat(v, α) ⇒ xi (e) ∈ sat(v, α).
It remains to prove that y(e) ⊆ S\X . Assume that this is not true. Since e is
an α-exit sequence from Y , we have y(e) ⊆ S\Y = (X \ Y ) ∪ (S\X). Then, by
our assumption y(e)  S\X , there must be h ∈ {1, . . . , k(e)} with the property
yh(e) ∈ X\Y ⊆ X . Choose the smallest h with this property. Let f = (xh(e), yh(e)),
and let f = (x j (e), y j (e))h−1j=1.
Observe then that f is an α-exit sequence from X disregarding t and that f is an
α-cap for (X, f, t). Thus, f ∈ F(X, f, t, α) ⊆ F(X, e∗, t, α), where the inclusion is
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by Lemma 4.9. We also have first( f ) ∈ Y and last( f ) ∈ S\Y , as f is an edge from
an α-exit sequence from Y . The set Y is an ergodic set of the graph H , so f is not an
edge of H . Thus, f /∈ F(X, e∗, t, α). Contradiction.
So indeed, e is an α-exit sequence from X disregarding t . Then it is even a positive
α-exit sequence from X disregarding t , since it is a positive α-exit sequence from
Y . It also follows that e∗ is a positive α-exit sequence from X disregarding t , by the
maximality of e∗. Contradiction.
B: So we have indeed t ∈ Y . We will prove by contradiction that condition (ii) of the
lemmaholds.Assume therefore that g ∈ viable(t, α) existswithx(e∗)∪esc(X, α) ⊆
sat(g, α) and t /∈ sat(g, δ).
B-1: Proof that t /∈ pos(Y, α).
Chooseu ∈ B(t, α). Since t ∈ Y and since (t, u) is an edgeof the graph H , it follows
that u ∈ Y , by the properties of an ergodic set. Also by the properties of an ergodic set,
a path p in H from u to t exists with N(p) ⊆ Y . Notice that 〈p, g〉 ∈ viable(u, α),
by Lemma 4.10.
Notice that t ∈ sat(v, δ) for all v ∈ admiss(t, u, α), since we chose u ∈ B(t, α).
Apparently, 〈p, g〉 /∈ admiss(t, u, α), as we have t /∈ sat(g, δ) = sat(〈p, g〉, δ).
Then, plan 〈p, g〉 violates all three conditions AD-i, AD-ii, and AD-iii. Now, from
the fact that 〈p, g〉 violates AD-ii, we deduce that t /∈ pos(Y, α).
B-2: Proof that
∀x ∈ Y\{t}, ∀y ∈ A(x)\Y, ∀v ∈ viable(y, α) : t ∈ sat(v, α) ∨ x ∈ sat(v, α).
We further exploit the properties of plan g and path p, chosen in B-1 to prove that
t /∈ pos(Y, α). Choose x ∈ N(p)\{t}. Now, from the fact that 〈p, g〉 violates AD-iii,
we deduce that
∀y ∈ A(x)\Y, ∀v ∈ viable(y, α) : t ∈ sat(v, α) ∨ x ∈ sat(v, α), (1)
as this formally negates the existence of a ‘threat’ plan for player x that starts at an
element of A(x)\Y (Notice that the elements of A(x)\Y do not coincide with the
follower of x on path p, since N(p) ⊆ Y ). We need to prove that Eq. (1) not only
holds for x ∈ N(p)\{t}, but for all x ∈ Y\{t}.
Choose x ∈ Y\{t} arbitrarily. By the properties of an ergodic set and the fact that
t ∈ Y , a path q in H exists from t to x with N(q) ⊆ Y . Obviously, we may require
that there is only one occurrence of t on this path, at the beginning. Let q˜ denote the
part of q that starts at the second state. There also exists a path r in H from x to t
with N(r) ⊆ Y , and we may require that there is only one occurrence of t on this
path, at the end. Let p′ = 〈q˜, r〉. Clearly, p′ is a path in H from first(p′) to t with
N(p′) ⊆ Y and with only one occurrence of t on this path, at the end. We claim that
first(p′) ∈ B(t, α). Indeed, this is true, because (t, first(p′)) is an edge of the graph
H and edges of the type (t, u) in H all have the property u ∈ B(t, α).
We now let p′ play the role of the earlier chosen path p, and argue similarly that
〈p′, g〉 is an α-viable plan, such that 〈p′, g〉 /∈ admiss(t, first(p′), α). From the fact
that plan 〈p′, g〉 violates AD-iii, and the fact that plan 〈p′, g〉 is constructed such that
the first occurrence of x is before t , it follows that Eq. (1) holds indeed.
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B-3: Proof that Y ∈ X (α).
We trivially have Y ∈ P(α). We also have Y ∈ C by the properties of an ergodic
set. Since t /∈ pos(Y, α), we may write
esc(Y, α) ∩ pos(Y, α) = (esc(Y, α)\{t}) ∩ pos(Y, α).
We have
esc(Y, α)\{t} ⊆ esc(X, α)\{t} ⊆ esc(X, δ)\{t} ⊆ esc(X, δ),
where the first inclusion is by Lemma 4.12 and the second inclusion Lemma 3.9-(iv).
We also have pos(Y, α) ⊆ pos(X, δ), by the fact that Y ⊆ X and α ≤ δ. Therefore,
esc(Y, α) ∩ pos(Y, α) = (esc(Y, α)\{t}) ∩ pos(Y, α) ⊆ esc(X, δ) ∩ pos(X, δ) = ∅,
where the last equality is by the fact that X ∈ X (δ) ⊆ E(δ). This proves that Y ∈ E(α),
hence Y ∈ P(α) ∩ E(α) ∩ C = X (α).
B-4: Existence of a positive α-exit sequence from Y disregarding t .
SinceY ∈ X (α) and sinceα ∈ ∗, we can choose a positive α-exit sequencee from
Y . Let e denote the sequence that results from e by deleting all edges (x j (e), y j (e))
with the property x j (e) = t . We claim that e is a positive α-exit sequence from Y
disregarding t .
Since e is an α-exit sequence from Y , we have x(e) ⊆ Y . Then x(e) ⊆ Y\{t} due
to the construction of e. Obviously, we have y(e) ⊆ S\Y , as e is an α-exit sequence
from Y .
Let j ∈ {1, . . . , k(e)}, let v ∈ viable(y j (e)), and assume that
{x1(e), . . . , x j−1(e)} ∪ (esc(Y, α)\{t}) ⊆ sat(v, α).
Notice that the result of B-2 applies here, since x j (e) ∈ Y\{t} and y j (e) ∈ A(x)\Y .
Thus,we have t ∈ sat(v, α) or x j (e) ∈ sat(v, α). In fact, we have x j (e) ∈ sat(v, α).
Indeed, in the case t ∈ sat(v, α), we have
{x1(e), . . . , xi−1(e)} ∪ esc(Y, α) ⊆ sat(v, α),
where i ∈ {1, . . . , k(e)} is such that xi (e) = x j (e). It then follows that x j (e) =
xi (e) ∈ sat(v, α), by the fact that (xi (e), yi (e)) is a (α, {x1(e), . . . , xi−1(e)})–exit
from Y . Thus, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k(e)} and for all v ∈ viable(y j (e)), we have
{x1(e), . . . , x j−1(e)} ∪ (esc(Y, α)\{t}) ⊆ sat(v, α) ⇒ x j (e) ∈ sat(v, α).
This proves that e is an α-exit sequence from Y disregarding t .
Since e is a positive α-exit sequence from Y , we have x(e) ∩ pos(X, α) = ∅. We
have t /∈ pos(X, α), by the result of B-1. Therefore, x(e) ∩ pos(X, α) = x(e) ∩
pos(X, α) = ∅. It follows that e is a positive α-exit sequence from Y disregarding t .
The sequence e will now be used to derive a contradiction.
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B-5: Derivation of the contradiction.
We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: Suppose thaty(e) ⊆ S\X .We then claim that e is a positive α-exit sequence
from X disregarding t . For this, it remains to prove that, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k(e)} and
for all v ∈ viable(y j (e)), we have
{x1(e), . . . , x j−1(e)} ∪ (esc(X, α)\{t}) ⊆ sat(v, α) ⇒ x j (e) ∈ sat(v, α).
Indeed, this is true because (i), we have
{x1(e), . . . , x j−1(e)} ∪ (esc(Y, α)\{t}) ⊆ sat(v, α) ⇒ x j (e) ∈ sat(v, α).
by the fact that e is an α-exit sequence from Y disregarding t , and because (ii), we
have esc(Y, α)\{t} ⊆ esc(X, α)\{t}, by Lemma 4.12.
So e is a positive α-exit sequence from X disregarding t . Then e∗ is also a positive
α-exit sequence from X disregarding t , since we have x(e∗) ∩ pos(X, α) ⊇ x(e) ∩
pos(X, α) = ∅ by the maximality of e∗. This contradicts our assumption at the
beginning of the lemma.
Case 2: Suppose that y(e)  S\X . Then there must be h ∈ {1, . . . , k(e)} with the
property yh(e) ∈ X . Choose the smallest h with this property. Let f = (xh(e), yh(e)),
and let f = (x j (e), y j (e))h−1j=1.
Observe then that f is an α-exit sequence from X disregarding t and that f is an
α-cap for (X, f, t). Then f ∈ F(X, f, t, α) ⊆ F(X, e∗, t, α), where the inclusion is
by Lemma 4.9. We also have first( f ) ∈ Y and last( f ) ∈ S\Y , as f is an edge from
an α-exit sequence from Y . The set Y is an ergodic set of the graph H , so f is not an
edge of H . Thus, f /∈ F(X, e∗, t, α). Contradiction. unionsq
Lemma 4.14 For all X ∈ W(t, δ), a positive δ-exit sequence from X exists.
Proof Let X ∈ W(t, δ) and let e∗ be a maximal α-exit sequence from X disregarding
t . If e∗ is a positive α-exit sequence from X disregarding t , then it is also a positive
δ-exit sequence from X by Lemma 4.6, and we are done. Assume from here that e∗ is
not a positive α-exit sequence from X disregarding t . Then, by Lemma 4.13, we have
for all v ∈ viable(t, α),
x(e∗) ∪ esc(X, α) ⊆ sat(v, α) ⇒ t ∈ sat(v, δ). (2)
We distinguish between the cases t ∈ esc(X, α) ∩ pos(X, α) and t /∈ esc(X, α) ∩
pos(X, α).
First suppose t ∈ esc(X, α) ∩ pos(X, α). Since t ∈ esc(X, α), we can choose
s ∈ S\X , such that s ∈ safestep(t, α). We claim that (e∗, (t, s)) is a δ-exit sequence
from X . For this, we only need to check that (t, s) is a (x(e∗), δ)–exit from X , since
we already know that e∗ is a δ-exit sequence from X , by Lemma 4.6. We have indeed
t ∈ sat(v, δ) for every v ∈ viable(s, δ)withx(e∗)∪esc(X, δ) ⊆ sat(v, δ), because
e∗ satisfies condition (ii) of Lemma 4.13 and because esc(X, δ) ⊇ esc(X, α)\{t} by
Lemma 3.9-(iv). Then (e∗, (t, s)) is also a positive δ-exit sequence from X , since
t ∈ pos(X, α) ⊆ pos(X, δ).
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Now suppose t /∈ esc(X, α) ∩ pos(X, α). We claim that X ∈ X (α).
According to Lemma 4.11, the graph H(X, e∗, t, α) has an ergodic set Y such that
pos(Y, α) = ∅. It follows that pos(X, α) ⊇ pos(Y, α) = ∅. Thus, X ∈ P(α).
We also have X ∈ E(α), since
esc(X, α) ∩ pos(X, α)
= (esc(X, α)\{t}) ∩ pos(X, α) ⊆ esc(X, δ) ∩ pos(X, δ) = ∅,
where the first equality follows, since t /∈ esc(X, α) ∩ pos(X, α).
Obviously, X ∈ C, since X ∈ X (δ) ⊆ C. So indeed, X ∈ P(α)∩E(α)∩C = X (α).
Now, sinceα ∈ ∗ and X ∈ X (α), we can choose a positive α-exit sequence f from
X . If t ∈ esc(X, α), we require that t /∈ x(f), which is possible by Lemma 4.1-(ii).
We claim that (e∗, f) is a positive δ-exit sequence from X .
It is obvious that an edge in (e∗, f) of the form (x j (e∗), y j (e∗)) is a (δ, {x1(e∗), . . . ,
x j−1(e∗)})–exit from X , as e∗ is a δ-exit sequence from X , by Lemma 4.6.
It is straightforward to prove that an edge in (e∗, f) of the form (x j (f), y j (f)) and
with x j (f) = t is a (δ, {x1(f), . . . , x j−1(f)})–exit from X , using the fact that f is an
α-exit sequence from X . Then the edge is also a (δ,x(e∗)∪{x1(f), . . . , x j−1(f)})-exit
from X .
It remains to prove for an edge in f of the type (t, s), say (t, s) = (x j (f), y j (f)),
that it is a (δ,x(e∗) ∪ {x1(f), . . . , x j−1(f)})–exit from X . Let v ∈ viable(s, δ), and
assume that
x(e∗) ∪ {x1(f), . . . , x j−1(f)} ∪ esc(X, δ) ⊆ sat(v, δ). (3)
We need to prove that t ∈ sat(v, δ). The fact that t appears in the α-exit sequence f
implies that t /∈ esc(X, α), by the choice of f . Thus,
esc(X, α) = esc(X, α)\{t} ⊆ esc(X, δ)\{t} ⊆ esc(X, δ),
where the first inclusion is by Lemma 3.9-(iv). Assumption (3) therefore implies that
{x1(f), . . . , x j−1(f)} ∪ esc(X, α) ⊆ sat(v, δ) ⊆ sat(v, α).
We then obtain that t = x j (f) ∈ sat(v, α) from the fact that f is an α-exit sequence
from X and the fact that v ∈ viable(s, δ) ⊆ viable(s, α).
Assumption (3) also implies
x(e∗) ∪ esc(X, α) ⊆ sat(v, α) = sat(〈(t, s), v〉, α).
Notice that the plan 〈(t, s), v〉 is α-viable, since we just proved that t ∈ sat(v, α).
Then, by Eq. (2), it subsequently follows that t ∈ sat(v, δ).
We proved that (e∗, f) is a δ-exit sequence from X . It is a positive δ-exit sequence
from X , since x((e∗, f)) ∩ pos(X, δ) ⊇ x(f) ∩ pos(X, α) = ∅. unionsq
The following result is a direct consequence of Corollary 4.5 and Lemma 4.14.
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Corollary 4.15 δ ∈ ∗.
We have arrived at the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.16 There exists a vector α∗ ∈ ∗ such that δ(t, α∗) = α∗t for all t ∈ N.
Proof We construct a sequence (αk)k∈N with αk ∈ RN for all k ∈ N as follows.
We set α1 = ρ, where ρ is the vector defined by ρt = rt (t) for all t ∈ N . For
k > 1, the vector αk is obtained from αk−1 by replacing one of its coordinates, say t ,
by the updated value δ(t, αk−1). For the coordinate t , we choose the smallest one with
the property δ(t, αk−1) = αk−1t if there is such a coordinate, and we choose t = 1
otherwise (Since N = {1, . . . , n}, there is a natural ordering of the elements of N ,
which we use here).
Notice that this indeed defines an infinite sequence of vectors in RN (i.e. the con-
struction of the sequence will not halt due to a coordinate that becomes infinite): we
have α1 = ρ ∈ ∗ ⊆ RN by Lemma 4.2, and we obtain αk ∈ ∗ ⊆ RN for all k > 1
by induction with Corollary 4.15.
Further, notice that, for any α ∈ ∗ and t ∈ N , the number δ(t, α) can only take
values in the set Vt = {0} ∪ {rt (s) | s ∈ N }, since δ(t, α) is defined as the average
reward for t associated with some plan. We have α1t = ρt = rt (t) ∈ Vt for all t ∈ N .
Thus, we obtain αkt ∈ Vt for all k ∈ N, by induction.
If αk = αk−1 for k > 1, then the difference between these two vectors is in one
coordinate. By Corollary 3.8, there is an increase in that coordinate when we go from
αk−1 to αk . There can be at most n increases of coordinate t , for any t ∈ N , since
αkt ∈ Vt for all k ∈ N and since Vt has cardinality n + 1. As there are |N | = n
different coordinates, the total number of increases is bounded by n2. It follows that
the sequence (αk)k∈N is eventually constant.
Thus, we can choose k such that αk = αk−1. This means that δ(t, αk−1) = αk−1t
for all t ∈ N , i.e. αk−1 satisfies the requirements of the theorem. unionsq
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